Abstract. In order to improve the efficiency of certificate-based signature scheme, a new certificate-based signature scheme based on cubic residue is proposed. The scheme does not need any bilinear pairing computation which is known to be difficult to computation. The scheme is secure against existing forgery on the adaptively chosen message and identity attack under assumption of the hardness of integer factorization.
Introduction
In 1984, Shamir [1] introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography (IBC) to solve the certificate management problem. In an identity-based signature scheme, an entity's public key is derived directly from its identity, such as identity number, email address, and IP address associated with a user. Private keys are generated for users by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG). Although IBC eliminates the need for certificates, the key escrow problem is inherent. Because the PKG knows any user's private key, it may impersonate any user or decrypt any cipher texts. Moreover, the users' private keys must be sent over secure channels. Kang et al. [2] proposed the security notion of certificate-based signature (CBS). They also proposed two concrete certificate-based signature schemes and a certificate-based proxy signature scheme. Unfortunately, Li et al. [3] pointed out that one of their schemes was insecure against key replacement attack and proposed a new efficient certificate-based signature scheme. Li et al. [4, 5] presented a forward-secure certificate-based signature scheme and a certificate-based key-insulated signature respectively. Nevertheless, the above schemes require pairing operations. The pairing computation is considered as expensive comparing with normal operations such as modular exponentiations in finite fields. Research on cryptography protocol without pairing is mainly focused on certificateless encryption. In 2005, Baek et al. [6] proposed the first certificate-less encryption scheme without pairing. Unfortunately, their scheme exists one drawback that the security proof only holds for a weaker security model in which the Type I adversary is not allowed to replace the public key associated with the challenge identity. Sun et al. [7] eliminated this limitation and constructed a strongly secure certificate-less encryption scheme without pairing. Selvi et al. [8] constructed an efficient certificate-less sign-cryption scheme without pairing. However, certificate-less encryption scheme suffers from the denial of decryption (DoD) attack. In order to solve the above problem, Lai and Kou [9] proposed a self-generated-certificate public key encryption without pairing, which captured the DoD Attack. Liu et al. [10] first proposed a certificated-based signature scheme without pairings and another certificate-based signature scheme whose security can be proven in the standard model. However, Zhang [11] showed that the scheme without pairings was insecure and gave an improved scheme with pairings. Ming and Wang [12] proposed a certificate-based signature scheme without pairings. Li et al. [13] showed that the scheme is subject to universal forgery for a Type II adversary and constructed a new certificate-based signature scheme. Under the discrete logarithm assumption, the scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model. Recently, Rong et al. [14] proposed a certificate-based signature scheme. The scheme does not need any bilinear pairing computation, just needs compute Jacobi symbol, quadratic residue and power exponentiation. In this paper we propose a new certificate-based signature scheme based on cubic residue. If one selects proper parameters, the computational efficiency of constructing a cubic residue is better than constructing a quadratic residue. The scheme is secure against existing forgery on the adaptively chosen message and identity attack under assumption of the hardness of integer factorization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief review of Rong et al.'s scheme. In Section 3, a certificate-based signature scheme based on cubic residues is proposed. 
The user with the identity ID computes 
Concluding remarks
Using a novel method to compute a cubic root of a cubic residue, we have proposed a new certificate-based signature scheme based on cubic residue. Under assumption of the hardness of integer factorization, our scheme can be shown to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model as in [15] . Compared with [15] , our scheme enjoys less operation cost.
